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JURISDICTION 
Under Rule 42(a) U.R.A.P. the Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over cases transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Under Rule 3 U.R.A.P. the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
over a final order from a District Court. Such is the case here. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing the Appellee 
Christiansen where the court determined that there were no 
outstanding causes of action against Mr. Christiansen. 
2. Did the trial court err in dismissing the Appellee Sykes 
where the court determined that there were no outstanding causes 
of action against Mr. Sykes. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES & 
REGULATIONS 
None at issue 
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FACTS 
The original case was filed by Mr. Hatch et. al. on May 9 
1983. The principal claims by Mr. Hatch are: 
1) They were the owners of a piece of land that was about to 
be sold at trustee sale. 
2) Virginia Flynn had agreed to rescue the Mr. Hatch from the 
sale. 
3) Mr Sykes, Zions Bank and Zions Bank's attorney scared her 
off by claiming that a lawsuit was possible and imminent. 
4) The land was sold at trustee sale. 
5) Mr. Christiansen bought the property on behalf of Mr. 
Sykes. 
The case has been off and on for the years due to the 
antipathy of the litigants and the fact that Mr. Hatch and some of 
his alter egos have been in and out of bankruptcy several times 
during the period. The three cases were all consolidated since they 
had some basis in the same issues and facts. The root cause of the 
controversy is a piece of property in Provo which Mr. Sykes and Mr. 
Hatch both claimed to own. Both Mr. Sykes and Mr. Hatch claim that 
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many evil deeds were perpetrated by the other. 
Mr. Sykes claims that Mr. Hatch contracted to sell him the 
property and since reneged on the deal. Mr. Hatch claims that 
because of Mr. Sykes vigorous pursuit of his claim to the property 
a person willing to loan money on the property was scared off. Mr. 
Hatch claims that the money would have saved the property from 
foreclosure by Zions Bank. 
The money was not loaned to Mr. Hatch and therefore the 
property foreclosed on and sold to Mr. Christiansen at a sheriffs 
sale. 
Mr. Hatch filed suit against Mr. Sykes, Zions Bank, Mr. 
Christiansen and Zions Bank's lawyers. Mr. Hatch settled its 
problems with Zions and Zions lawyers for a cash payment. Due to 
settlement and the affirmation of the sheriff's sale Mr. 
Christiansen was dismissed from the suit on his motion. On separate 
motion, all claims against Mr. Sykes were also dismissed after the 
trial court determined that, with no claim on the property Mr. 
Hatch no longer had a cause of action against Mr. Sykes. Mr. Sykes 
counterclaims against Mr. Hatch and the Ragozzines were also 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Slander of title requires that Mr. Hatch have some interest 
in the property. There is no interest in the property due to the 
sale of the property and subsequent affirmation of the sale. 
With the settlement of the property question with Zions Bank 
there are no longer any prayers for relief that are valid. 
The elements of fraud were not even alleged in the complaint 
so no fraud could possibly exist. 
There is no responsibility on the part of the court to create 
the legal arguments and theories under which Mr. Hatch may recover. 
After almost 10 years of litigation, Plaintiff should know what he 
is suing for and why without the assistance of the court. 
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ARGUMENT 
The lower court held that the claims of Mr. Hatch et al must 
be dismissed based upon two independent grounds. The lower court 
stated that the slander of title action could not be maintained, 
given that Mr. Hatch no longer had an interest in the property in 
question; and that even if he held such an interest, the complaint 
no longer stated a relief which could be granted. 
The second tier of the lowers court's decision revolves around 
the undisputed fact that only prayers for relief 3 and 4 and 
possibly 5 were still valid. These prayers read: 
3. for punitive damages against defendant Zion's and 
Sykes of $450,000 for willful and malicious conduct in 
connection with the transaction which is the subject of 
this complaint; 
4. for actual damages of $150,000 in the event the 
property is lost by the plaintiffs through the actions 
of the defendants; 
5. and the costs of this action, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee together with such relief as the court may 
deem just and proper. 
Mr. Hatch in attempting to obtain summary disposition in 
reversing the lower court's decision has proposed a series of 
arguments: 
SLANDER OF TITLE REQUIRES SOME INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
First, Mr. Hatch claims that the lower court was wrong in its 
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holding that a slander of title requires that Mr. Hatch hold some 
interest in the property. 
The prevailing rule is and has been that where a party does 
not have an interest in the property slandered he has no standing 
to sue. The fact of a past interest is not sufficient to create 
such standing. In Bennett v Pace, 731 P.2d 33 (Wyo 1987) a similar 
situation to the instant case was decided. In that case a 
contractor placed a mechanic's lien on the property of the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently sold the property and then 
brought suit against the contractor for slander of title in placing 
the lien. The Supreme Court of Wyoming ruled that the plaintiff had 
no standing to file such a suit since they no longer had an 
interest in the property. 
Such is the case here. In this case the lawsuit was filed 
after the property had been foreclosed and subsequently sold. At 
the time of the filing of the lawsuit Mr. Hatch did not have an 
interest in the property. Therefore he had no standing to bring a 
slander of title action. 
Even if Mr. Hatch had some claim to the property at the 
beginning of the suit, Mr. Hatch along with all other plaintiffs 
during the pendency of the suit settled their claim to the 
property. In that settlement the plaintiffs (Mr. Hatch) agreed in 
their stipulation that: 
Plaintiffs ... agree that the trustee's sale ... was a 
bona fide, arm's length, non-collusive, valid and binding 
Trustee's sale. ... Plaintiffs ... waive and abandon any 
• • • claims and defenses .. • which • • • challenge or 
dispute the validity ... of the Trustee's Sale or the 
title of the purchaser at the Trustee's sale. 
6 
If Mr. Hatch had any claim to the property before the 
settlement, any such claim was subsequently extinguished. Therefore 
if Mr. Hatch had standing to assert slander of title previous to 
the settlement, he had no such standing subsequent to it. 
It is undisputed that Mr. Hatch has no current interest in the 
property as required by a slander of title action. Therefore an 
action for slander of title cannot proceed. 
THERE IS NO LONGER A VALID PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Second, Mr. Hatch contends that the court was wrong in ruling 
that the loss of the property in question was not due to the 
actions of the defendants. 
Neither Mr Christiansen nor Mr. Sykes et al foreclosed on the 
property. That action was taken by Zion's bank when Mr. Hatch et 
al failed to make the necessary payments. The property was then 
sold at trustee's sale, not by Mr. Christiansen nor Mr. Sykes, but 
at the behest of Zions bank. 
Subsequent to the foreclosure and filing of the lawsuit any 
rights to the property were transferred to Zions bank and 
subsequent purchasers by the settlement negotiated by Mr. Hatch and 
the other plaintiffs. Again, neither Mr. Christiansen nor Mr. Sykes 
had any input or involvement in that settlement. 
It is irrational to conclude that the loss of the property was 
due to the actions of Mr. Christiansen or Mr. Sykes. The actions 
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precedent to the loss of the property were the result of actions 
taken by Mr. Hatch et al. 
There is therefore no basis to award relief based on prayer 
for relief #4. 
Since punitive damages are derivative in nature, if actual 
damages cannot be awarded punitive damages likewise cannot be 
awarded. Therefore prayer #3 is also no longer valid. 
Given that there is no longer a prayer that could be granted, 
there is no longer a set of facts that could lead to relief for the 
plaintiffs. 
THERE WAS NO SET OF FACTS ALLEGED UNDER WHICH RELIEF 
COULD BE GRANTED 
Third, Mr. Hatch's third and fourth arguments can be folded 
together. Mr. Hatch argues that even if the relief requested in the 
complaint was no longer valid, the court should have granted Mr. 
Hatch some unspecified relief to which he was entitled and that the 
lower court should not have decided the case while a real 
controversy was outstanding. 
Mr. Hatch relies upon Rule 54(c)(1) U.R.C.P. for this 
interpretation. Mr. Hatch is misusing this rule in as much as this 
rule grants the court broad discretion in formulating the type of 
relief that is granted. This is not a rule of compulsion but 
discretion for the bench. Further this rule does not force the 
judge to recast the arguments and facts of the case in order to 
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formulate some legal theory or cause of action under which the Mr. 
Hatch may recover. It is the burden of Mr. Hatch to carry the 
burden of producing the theory and arguments that will demonstrate 
his case, not that of the judge. Mr. Hatch has not carried this 
burden. 
The case was dismissed based upon defendants' motion for a 
12(b)(6) dismissal because the pleadings did not state a cause of 
action under which relief could be granted. A 12(b)(6) motion for 
dismissal for failure of the pleadings is to be treated as a motion 
for summary judgement. Such a motion should be granted only where 
it appears as a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to 
relief under no state of facts which could be proved in support of 
the claim. See Hughes v. Howslev. 599 P.2d 1250,1252 (Utah 1979). 
The pertinent facts of this appeal are not in dispute. The 
plaintiffs settled their action with Zions Bank and agreed that the 
trustee sale was valid. The defendants Christiansen and Sykes had 
no part in that settlement. Likewise, the only involvement of Mr. 
Christiansen in the subsequent sale was to purchase the property. 
The defendants were not the cause of the loss of plaintiffs' 
property. The property was "lost" at trustee's sale and remaining 
claims were extinguished by the settlement between plaintiffs and 
Zions bank. 
But, even if we must go to the merits of the case, it is still 
clear that no facts are alleged under which the cause of action 
could possibly succeed. The plaintiff has alleged two causes of 
action - fraud and slander of title. As we have seen above, the 
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slander of title action cannot survive as a matter of law since one 
of the essential elements (title to the property) is missing. 
Likewise fraud or misrepresentation is insufficient grounds 
for relief in that the essential elements for such an action have 
not even been alleged. 
Mr. Hatch alleges in the cause of action for "Bad Faith and 
Fraud" that Mr. Christiansen was the 
"strawman purchaser for ZIONS, who had already entered 
into an agreement with Defendant Sykes for the sale of 
the subject premises, and that ZIONS, CHRISTIANSEN and 
SYKES together conspired to defraud Plaintiffs of their 
rightful claims to the premises11. 
See First Amended Complaint page 7. Since Mr. Christiansen was not 
in privity of contract with the Plaintiffs nor in any relationship 
which would require the exercise of good faith, the cause of action 
for bad faith does not apply to Mr. Christiansen. 
Mr. Hatch claims in his third cause of action a right to 
recover for conspiracy to defraud. Frankly, I have no idea what 
conspiracy to defraud might mean. Conspiracy is not a recognized 
tort and is normally seen only in criminal matters in conjunction 
with a crime. Assuming therefore, that Mr. Hatch is claiming that 
Mr. Christiansen and/or Mr. Sykes committed a fraud against him, 
we will explore that possibility. 
Mr. Hatch contends that the broad definition of fraud 
contained in Black's law dictionary is pertinent to the case. But, 
Black's contains no elements for the prima facia case nor does it 
explain what an "artifice to defraud" might be. Nor does Mr. Hatch 
explain how his case might show this to be a fraud under the 
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Black's definition. 
The actual tort of fraud is seen only as encompassed by the 
tort of intentional misrepresentation which is also known as fraud 
or deceit. To establish intentional misrepresentation (or fraud) 
the following elements must be proved: 
1. Misrepresentation (made by defendant) 
2. Scienter - malice 
3. An intent to induce plaintiff's reliance upon the 
misrepresentation. 
4. Causation 
5. Justifiable reliance 
6. Damages. 
The case alleged by Mr. Hatch fails on at least four or these 
elements. First, there simply was no misrepresentation and no 
allegation of misrepresentation committed by Mr. Christiansen or 
Mr. Sykes. Mr. Christiansen did not make any statements to Mr. 
Hatch which were a false representation of a material past or 
present fact. Indeed, the only communication alleged between Mr. 
Christiansen and Mr. Hatch is the presentation of a Lis Pendens to 
Mr. Christiansen immediately prior to the sale. 
Second, there is no allegation of intent to induce the Mr. 
Hatch's reliance upon a misrepresentation. As we have seen, there 
is no allegation that any misrepresentation occurred. 
Third, there is no causation. Mr. Hatch seeks damages for the 
loss of his property. The loss of the property was caused by the 
foreclosure and subsequent sale by Zions. The person who bought the 
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property (Mr. Christiansen) can not be held responsible for the 
default of the Plaintiffs. 
Fourth, there is no justifiable reliance. First there was no 
misrepresentation on which to rely. Even if there had been some 
misrepresentation, there was no reliance upon that 
misrepresentation that could have caused damages. Even if Mr. 
Christiansen had claimed himself not to be a purchaser for the 
benefit of Sykes or Zions and it later came to be shown that Sykes 
and Zions had induced Mr. Christiansen to buy the property, there 
was no reliance by Mr. Hatch on such an assertion. The motivation 
for Mr. Christiansen's purchase of the property is of no 
consequence to the fact that the property was being sold due to 
foreclosure. No reliance by Mr. Hatch on the independence, or lack 
thereof, of Mr. Christiansen could change the essential facts of 
foreclosure and sale. Reliance on any statement of Mr. Christiansen 
was not alleged by the Plaintiffs, nor could any such reliance be 
justifiable. 
Hence, fraud or misrepresentation is not alleged in its 
essential elements. There is therefore no set of facts alleged 
under which relief could be granted for fraud. 
Mr. Hatch wants to have it both ways. He wishes to take the 
money from Zion's Bank and declare the trustee sale valid, while 
still claiming as interest in the land and a right to recover from 
Mr. Christiansen (who merely purchased the property at trustee 
sale) and Mr. Sykes. Judge Mower correctly decided that by 
affirming the validity of the trustee sale that the property was 
12 
no longer at issue and the Mr. Hatch had no interest in it. Judge 
Mower also noted that there was no set of facts alleged under which 
there was a cause of action by Mr. Hatch. 
CONCLUSION 
There are no facts alleged which could justify the 
continuation of this lawsuit. There is no prayer for relief which 
could be granted, since title to the property in question has been 
settled voluntarily between Mr. Hatch and Zions. Further the 
essential elements for recovery based on slander of title or fraud 
either do not exist or have not been alleged. 
This vexatious litigation has been going on for more than a 
decade. If there are insufficient facts at this late date to 
justify the continued litigation, there never will be. The decision 
of the trial court to dismiss should be affirmed. 
4- A: 
Sam Primavera 
Attorney for Defendant Appellee Christiansen 
Dwane Sykes 
Defendant Appellee pro se 
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